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Sectoral state aid accounts for 56 percent of total aid 
in Croatia, and “only” 25 percent in EU-15. Can subsi-
dized sectors in Croatia expect generous aid also in the 
future? This paper tries to explain the negative effects 
of state aid, the relevant EU requirements and practice 
and desirable future trends in the size and structure of 
state aid in Croatia.
1 State Aid Effects
State aid is an industrial policy instrument enabling 
the government to directly influence the course of 
development of certain enterprises or economic sec-
tors. By providing aid, the government favours cer-
tain enterprises or economic sectors, thus steering their 
development. However, this does not mean that indi-
vidual aid, although beneficial to a particular enter-
prise, would result in overall economic growth. Over-
all economic growth even weakens if aid is directed to 
less efficient businesses, producing low-quality goods 
at high costs. Similarly, economic growth accelerates if 
aid is aimed at correcting market failures, i.e. dealing 
with market disturbances. 
Selective aid has a number of adverse effects. State 
aid, particularly that which serves for the implementa-
tion of selective industrial policy, i.e. the policy of pro-
viding assistance only to selected sectors or enterprises, 
can be considered as “bad” aid, because it has a number 
of negative effects. Many researchers argue that: 
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•  The government is unable to select ‘winners’ or 
‘losers’, or to stop providing assistance. Selective 
industrial policy is implemented in the way that the 
government selects industries or enterprises need-
ing support. These are either prospective ‘winners’, 
i.e. industries or enterprises expected to grow at 
high rates, or ‘losers’, i.e. industries or enterprises 
in difficulties which need government assistance 
for survival and recovery. Owing to its inadequate 
administrative capacities and a lack of necessary 
information on products, prices or new technolo-
gies, the government has generally proved ineffi-
cient in allocating aid. Most frequently, it has been 
unable to select ‘winners’ and/or major loss makers 
among industries, or to pick the right moment to 
stop providing assistance, i.e. determine when an 
1 The complete study was published under the title: “State Aid Reform in Croatia” in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian Accession to the European Union - the Challenges of 
Participation. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance and Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2006, pp. 227-264; Available from: http://www.ijf.hr/Eu4/jovic-skreb.pdf.
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2  State Aid Policy in the European 
Union and in Croatia
State aid is basically prohibited in the EU, but their 
restricted application can still be authorised. Given 
the above drawbacks of state aid, the EU basically pro-
hibits all forms of aid, allowing only those that are speci-
fied by EU regulations. Consequently, the EU has adopt-
ed a highly elaborated set of rules implemented under 
the supervision of the European Commission, which are 
binding upon all Member States. These rules are par-
ticularly restrictive to sectoral state aid. Such selective 
aid distorts competition and postpones the exposure of 
businesses to the market which only rewards successful 
enterprises, thereby improving overall European com-
petitiveness. In contrast to sectoral aid, horizontal state 
aid (allocated for research and development, environ-
mental protection, energy conservation, employment, 
professional improvement, etc.) is viewed favourably, 
because it is equally allocated to all market participants 
and is much less distortive to competition than secto-
ral, i.e. selective aid.
State aid in the EU is trending towards less, but bet-
ter targeted aid. A new business philosophy has been 
developing in the EU, advocating a level playing filed 
for all undertakings on the market. A partnership between 
the market and public sector is expected to strengthen 
competitiveness and boost economic growth. In pursu-
ing this philosophy, the European Commission adopt-
ed a “State Aid Action Plan” for the period 2005-2009, 
with the main objective of achieving less and better tar-
geted aid by:
•  reducing the share of total aid in GDP;
•  redirecting aid from sectoral to horizontal objectives; 
and
•  establishing a more transparent and efficient system 
of state aid allocation and control.
State aid in Croatia is subject to the supervision of 
the Croatian Competition Agency. Pursuant to the 
State Aid Act of 2003, the Agency was charged with 
the approval, supervision and recovery of state aid as 
a body competent for the allocation of state aid to all 
business entities, excluding subsidies and fiscal incen-
tives to agriculture and fisheries. Over the past period, 
the administrative capacities of the Agency strength-
ened markedly, enabling it to take a number of measures 
aimed at informing state aid providers and beneficiar-
ies of the state aid regulations2. Through these regula-
tions Croatia took over the entire acquis communautaire 
industry becomes capable of operating independ-
ently. By applying inappropriate economic policy 
measures, the government has often caused distor-
tions in the economy, thus impairing its efficiency. 
Long-term provision of subsidies to loss-making 
enterprises which are unable to operate efficiently 
turned out to be a waste of the taxpayers’ money.
•  The government is incapable of resisting various 
pressure groups. In response to the pressure from 
various lobbies, the state intervention network 
becomes more sophisticated and the state admin-
istration increasingly liable to corruption. Once the 
state intervention stabilizes, there is a danger that 
the state would fall under the influence of vari-
ous interest groups lobbying hard to retain state 
aid, even though it ceased to be economically jus-
tifiable. Moreover, there are always new prospec-
tive beneficiaries who ‘could make good use’ of 
state aid.  Owing to the influence of such interest 
groups, it is difficult to discontinue state aid and 
new forms of state aid are introduced, making it 
difficult to break this vicious circle.
•  State aid also results in unfair competition between 
subsidized and non-subsidized enterprises. More 
specifically, owing to lower prices offered by sub-
sidized companies, yet not as the result of quality 
or productivity improvements, good but unsubsi-
dized companies with more expensive products are 
forced out of the market. This can gradually lead 
to monopolistic structures of the market.
•  Lack of motivation to improve production. Enter-
prises protected by state aid are unmotivated to 
reduce costs, modernize production and raise the 
quality of their products. This leads to lower effi-
ciency and reduces competitiveness of the over-
all economy.
•  State aid burdens the state budget and threatens its 
fiscal sustainability.  As state aid is financed from 
tax revenues, its cost is borne by all taxpayers. 
Thus, despite the lower prices of subsidized prod-
ucts, in the end consumers indirectly pay their full, 
non-subsidized prices through higher taxes.
•  State aid can create problems in international trade. 
Subsidizing domestic production by state aid pro-
vides a basis for the implementation of predato-
ry policy and appropriation of international mar-
ket shares. In response to such policy, the affected 
country may introduce retaliatory measures. 
2 The key regulations governing state aid in Croatia include: the State Aid Act (Official Gazette 140/05), Regulation on State Aid (Official Gazette 50/06) 
and Decision on the Publication of Rules on State Aid (Official Gazette 121/06).
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related to state aid, consisting of a rather large number 
of rules on about 365 pages. This accelerated the harmo-
nisation of the Croatian legislation with that of the EU. 
Upon accession of Croatia to the EU, the supervision 
of state aid will become the responsibility of the Euro-
pean Commission, like in all Member States.
In the pre-accession period, Croatia needs to reduce 
and restructure state aid. In order to make timely 
adjustments to the European state aid system, which is 
fully controlled by the European Commission, Croatia 
will have to gradually reform its state aid system. This 
particularly includes reducing the state aid-to-GDP ratio 
and redirecting aid from selected sectors to horizontal 
objectives. However, it should be noted that subsidies 
to individual sectors will not be completely abolished, 
but will be granted exclusively in compliance with the 
state aid rules taken over from the EU. This fact should 
be borne in mind when formulating any future indus-
trial policy of this country. Moreover, it is necessary to 
develop a transparent system of approval, supervision 
and recovery of state aid within the Agency.
3  The Size and Structure of State Aid 
in Croatia
The size of state aid in Croatia, measured by its 
share in GDP, is four times larger than in the EU. 
In the period 2001-2004, total aid excluding transport, 
agriculture and fisheries, accounted for 1.8 percent of 
GDP on average, compared with about 0,45 percent of 
GDP in EU-15. 
Table 1.  The Share of State Aid, Excluding Transport, 
Agriculture and Fisheries, in GDP (%)
2001 2002 2003 2004
average
2001-2004
EU-15 0.46 0.51 0.41 0.42
0.43*
0.45
Croatia 2.20 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.81
* Relates to EU-25. 
Source: European Commission and authors’ calculation.
The structure of state aid is unfavourable. The size 
of state aid is not the only problem facing Croatia in 
the pre-accession period, as the structure of aid differs 
from that in EU-15. In the period from 2001 to 2004, 
the largest portion of state aid (56 percent on average) 
in Croatia was allocated to selected economic sectors, 
while in the EU-15, sectoral aid accounted for only 25 
percent of total aid. Differences were also noted in hor-
izontal aid, while the data on regional aid for Croatia 
largely correspond with those for the EU. Compared 
with the ten new Member States, the structure of state 
aid in Croatia is closer to that in EU-15 than in EU-10. 
Table 2.  State Aid by Objective in Croatia (2001-04), 
EU-10 and EU-15 (2000-03) (%)
EU-15 EU-10 Croatia
Horizontal 52.2 14.9 17.2
Sectoral 24.8 75.9 56.1
Regional 23.0 9.2 26.7
Total aid* 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Excluding agriculture, fisheries and transport. 
Source: European Commission and authors’ calculation.
Transport, shipbuilding, ironworks and the rescue 
and restructuring of businesses account for almost 80 
percent of sectoral aid. It is these sectors that will have 
to undergo the sharpest changes during the EU-acces-
sion period and the harmonisation with the EU acquis 
in the field of competition. However, it should be reit-
erated that the goal of the reform is not to completely 
discontinue aid to these sectors but to restructure it sub-
stantially in terms of its size and objectives. The table 
below shows the total amounts of sectoral aid in Croatia 
and EU-15 and its respective shares in total aid.
Aid to transport can be classified into two groups: 
aid to railways and aid to other transport services. In 
the period 2001-2004, aid to railways in Croatia stood 
at 6.3 billion kuna, accounting for 80 percent of total 
aid to the transport sector. In line with the raised envi-
ronmental consciousness, the EU has viewed railways 
as a strategic sector and has therefore subsidized them 
generously (aid allocated to railways amounted to about 
EUR 25 billion in 2004). Therefore, Croatia will have to 
reform its state aid to railways, by drawing a strict line 
between supporting the services of general economic 
interest or investments in infrastructure, which is not 
considered as state aid, and transfers for the covering of 
current losses. A similar restructuring process is neces-
sary for road, sea, river and air transport. In the observed 
period, aid to these modes of transport approximated 3.8 
billion kuna, or 11.6 percent of total state aid in Croatia 
(about 2 percent in EU-15).
Croatian shipbuilding industry is a strongly sub-
sidized economic sector. Compared with EU-15, in 
which shipbuilding accounts for about 2 percent of 
total aid, state aid to shipyards in Croatia accounts for 
a high 20 percent of the total. State aid to this sector 
needs to undergo a comprehensive reform, particular-
ly because, the relevant EU rules, only allow the aid 
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granted for research and development, innovation or 
closure of shipyards, and related aid aimed at job crea-
tion, exports or development, as well as regional aid for 
investment in improvement or modernisation of existing 
facilities. In no way does this include aid for financial 
restructuring. It is for this reason that Croatia will have 
to reduce and restructure aid to shipyards, i.e. downsize 
the rescue aid provided to this sector.
The problem with iron industry is far less serious 
than with the previous two sectors. Here, adjustments 
will include reducing the amounts of aid and restruc-
turing its objective towards covering the cost of sur-
plus labour and the complete and final closure of iron-
works. This is in line with the practice of the EU, which 
reduced state aid to iron industry from an annual aver-
age of EUR 2 billion (in mid-1990s) to as low as EUR 
12 million in 2004, with the aid mainly targeted on envi-
ronmental protection. In the period 2001-2004, aid to 
ironworks in Croatia amounted to about 257 million 
kuna, about 1 percent of total state aid.
Aid to rescue and restructuring of enterprises has 
the most distorting effect on competition and is sub-
ject to special rules within the EU. Pursuant to these 
rules, aid is allocated according to the ‘one time, last 
time’ principle, i.e. it can only be allocated once in ten 
years. The rules further provide that rescue aid can be 
granted for a maximum of six months. After that, it is 
considered as restructuring aid, and the recipient is sup-
posed to participate in financing its own restructuring. 
In the period 2001-2004, rescue and restructuring aid in 
Croatia slightly exceeded 750 million kuna, accounting 
for 2.3 percent of total aid (1 percent in EU-15). Conse-
quently, Croatia will have to reduce the size of its res-
cue and restructuring aid, harmonize the relevant rules 
with the EU regulations and improve the transparency 
of state aid allocation in this area.
Table 3. Sectoral Aid in Croatia and EU-15
Objective Croatia 
(2001-2004, million kuna)
Share in total aid 
(2004, %)
Croatia EU-15
Railways 6,349.1 30.9 …
Transport (excl. railways) 3,843.9 11.6 2.0
Shipyards 2,566.6 20.0 2.0
Ironworks 257.1 1.5 0*
Rescue and restructuring 750.6 2.3 1
* i.e. EUR 12 million. 
Source: European Commission and authors’ calculation.
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